Introduction
In this essay, I offer a paraconsistent definition of religion which is compatible with critical theoretical developments seen in the Study of Religion in recent years. By providing such a definition, I will build a bridge between those scholars who hold that definition is required for rigorous academic studies and those who hold that definitions are examples of uncritical, even theological, scholarship. I begin by outlining the broad contours of the definitional debate in the Study of Religion and then examine what I mean by paraconsistent logic. I describe Graham Priest’s (1998; 2003; 2014) presentation of the inclosure paradox and demonstrate how this exists in two forms – an ontological and expressibility form – in the critical study of religion. Following this, I finish by defining religion – a definition which will operate at two related and unrelated ontological tiers – using paraconsistent, critically informed logic.
Definitional Problems in the Study of Religion
Since the establishment of the Study of Religion, there have been debates over how to define the core object of study – religion. In recent decades, scholars influenced by critical, postmodern theory have argued that defining religion is either an impossible or fruitless task. Timothy Fitzgerald (2000) has argued that because the category of religion was constructed within a historical and cultural context, the category’s use in ahistorical, universal, analytical ways is doomed to naturalise the ideologies and power dynamics which gave birth to it. Fitzgerald therefore concludes that the category of religion, as a heuristic tool, is worthless and should be abandoned. Russell McCutcheon (2003) has argued that the category religion is, due to its lack of a sui generis essence, whatever scholars want it to be. Scholars who define religion, therefore, are exposing their interests more than they are shining an academic light on whatever it is they classify as religious. Thus, while McCutcheon does not call for the category of religion to be abandoned and suggests that scholars are free to define religion how they like if they are self-reflective, the logic of his argument suggests that such definitional work is relatively meaningless.
These critical scholars have come up against many scholars of religion who accept some of the logic of what has been called the critical study of religion but believe that definitions of religion are valid academic exercises – if not a prerequisite for academic studies. The problem anti-definition scholars have with those that are pro-definition is that while the latter pay lip service to the former’s arguments, they still make normative and, in their eyes, uncritical claims by defining religion as if it is something which exists outside of semantic construction – outside, that is, of the realm of human conceptualisation. The problem, in other words, is that in work done by pro-definition scholars, it is hard to see where constructivism ends and realism begins and vice versa, and the reasons behind these seemingly arbitrary boundaries. Indeed, the division between these two definitional camps has become so heated and polarising in recent times that some critical scholars are calling for there to be a split within the academy (see, for example, Hughes, 2016).
The core problem with the definitional debate is that according to critical, anti-definition scholars, it is impossible to accept their constructivist logic while at the same time accept the possibility of defining religion in a positive way – i.e. to state what religion is rather than just what it is not (i.e. religion is not sui generis). This, however, might not be the case. Work in the philosophy of logic – in particular, work in dialethism and paraconsistent logic – demonstrate a possible means by which this core division can be overcome.
Dialetheism and Paraconsistent Logic
The study of dialetheism and paraconsistent logic is not homogeneous (Ripley, 2015); though, to keep things simple, we can follow basic definitions of both established by Graham Priest (1998; 2014), one of the most well-known proponents of both dialetheism and paraconsistent logic.
According to Priest (2014), dialethism is the position that accepts the truth of some paradoxes. Paraconsistent logic, on the other hand, recognises that some paradoxes do not lead to explosion – explosion being the breakdown of logic which results in meaningless relativism. These positions may sound similar, but there is a significant difference. Dialethism concerns questions of truth, whereas paraconsistent logic concerns issues of validity. In other words, if one accepts dialetheism one holds that some paradoxes are true, in a deeper ontological and epistemological sense. If one accepts paraconsistent logic, one holds that some paradoxes could be logically valid – i.e. not led to explosion; this does not mean, though, that those paradoxes are true. Thus, one can accept paraconsistent logic without accepting dialethism. The same is not true in reverse, though; one cannot accept dialethism and not accept paraconsistent logic.
For those familiar with classical logic, it should be apparent that paraconsistent logic differs in crucial respects. Most importantly, it does not include the law of the excluded middle and double negation elimination. For instance, following Priest’s (1998) presentation, it can be said that in classical logic, there is a dichotomy between truth and falsity. That is, when in classical logic a statement is evaluated, the evaluation acts as a function which classifies the statement as either true or false, but not both (412).
In paraconsistent logic, the situation is different. Instead, an evaluation is a relation ‘between formulas [i.e. statements] and truth values’ (412). Taking a relational view allows for more complexity than that permitted by classical logic. In particular, Priest discusses four relational outcomes which can be achieved as the result of a paraconsistent evaluation: true; false; true and false; neither true nor false. For instance, a relational evaluation of a statement may find it to be true in one sense and false in another, and these two findings can co-exist together logically.
What does a paraconsistent paradox look like? Priest (2014) picks on two illustrative examples: the inclosure paradox and the definability paradox. The former paradox is of most interest to us here. In the inclosure paradox, Priest emphasises that it is at the limits of thought that paraconsistency is manifest. In first-order logic terms, the limits of thought is represented by totality (Ω) – a set of all sets within which exist multiple sub-sets (x). In this case, there is also an operator (δ) which when applied to any subset of the totality creates a new object that exists within the totality but outside of the subset, iff such an action satisfies a condition (ѱ) (i.e. a logical condition, etc.). As Priest states, a contradiction will ‘arise if Ω itself satisfies ѱ’ (xx). There is a contradiction, that is, due to the combination of a bipartite structure of transcendence and closure – transcendence being when, after the function of δ and the meeting of ѱ, an object (o) arises above limits or totality (Ω); closure being when an object operates within limits or totality – that is, when an operator (δ) is ‘…applied to any suitable subset of Ω, [which then] gives another object that is in Ω’ (Garfield and Priest, 2003, 4; emphasis in original). Paraconsistency occurs, then, when both these features operate at the same time, what Priest calls inclosure – when the totality meets the conditions of the operator. Thus, the paradox arises when a ‘…δ is applied to the totality Ω itself. For then the application of δ gives an object that is both within and without Ω…’ (4).
A propositional way of unpacking this paradox would be an examination of Russell’s barber paradox, again following Priest. The paradox goes: ‘Within an enclosed community (where everyone is a man), there is only one barber. The barber is the one who shaves all those, and only those who do not shave themselves. Does the barber, then, shave himself?’.[4] A paradox arises regardless of how we answer this question. For instance, the barber cannot shave himself as he only shaves those who do not shave themselves. If the barber shaved himself, then he would cease to be the barber. Though, if he did not shave himself, he would fall into the category of those shaved by the barber, in which case he would have to shave himself, falling into the same paradoxical trap. In this paradox, then, the barber and the logic of his role stand for the totality (Ω). The other members of the enclosed community are subsets within that totality (x), the operator is the function of shaving (δ), and the condition is the community’s members need for a shave (ѱ). Thus, when the operator is applied to the subsets within the totality – when, that is, the function of shaving is applied to the members of the community, there is no problem. They create a new subset within the totality – the subset of shaved members – which does not lead to any logical difficulties. There are troubles, though, when the operator, shaving, is applied to the totality itself – when the barber needs a shave himself. When the operator is applied to the totality, we see both transcendence and closure. There is closure as the answer to whether the barber shaves himself is set within the logic of that the totality – the logic about the barber’s role holds in the answers given. There is transcendence as the barber also goes beyond the logic related to his role as every answer to the question of whether the barber shaves himself contradicts his position as the barber. The paradox is that it is the logic of him being a barber that makes it impossible for him to be a barber. The barber, then, both is and is not a barber in this paradox – i.e. that is, the barber exists in a state of inclosure.
This presentation of the inclosure paradox may be disputed. The core point, though, is that these paradoxes are not irrational for those who support paraconsistent logic, like Priest. Instead, following the reasoning of paraconsistent logic, an inclosure paradox is the conclusion of a line of logical reasoning which is argued to be correct. The outcome might not be consistent – one characteristic of reasonable judgment in classical logic – but that is not the only characteristic of valid statements (see Priest, 1998). The point of paraconsistent logic is that if paradoxes are the result of a line of acceptable reasoning, one should not reject them out of hand, as they may be, at a minimum, logically valid, if not true.
I see two inclosure, paraconsistent paradoxes in the study of religion, which arise when tackling the question of whether it is possible to define religion – an ontological paradox and an expressibility/semantic paradox. In particular, I see these paradoxes arising in the work of the critical study of religion scholars and their anti-definition positions. It is these paradoxes which I believe, once identified, can allow for a critical, paraconsistent definition of religion.
Ontological and Expressibility/Semantic Paradoxes in the Critical Study of Religion
The critical study of religion is not a homogeneous school of thought; there are, however, theoretical characteristics which are shared by many who define themselves as critical. I have briefly touched on these characteristics at the start of the essay. There is broad agreement as to the validity of social constructivism – that social actors construct the world and ‘religion’ is an invented category which does not exist outside the realm of human history. And there is scepticism about definitions – in particular, realist definitions. For instance, many critical scholars claim or at least sympathise with the view, that realist definitions – definitions which posit there is a signified which is captured by the signifier and not just constructed by it – are political acts which have no academic value. It is impossible, they argue, to talk about religion in a realist semantic sense; the only academic possibility is to study how others talk about religion. Thus, the critical study of religion is characterised by its opposition to an essentialist ontology and an essentialist semantics.
Ontological Paradox
The critical study of religion, then, is defined by two inclosure paradoxes – one ontological the other expressible/semantic. In simple terms, at the ontological level, the critical study of religion operates within the totality of constructivism. Subsets within that totality are the constructed objects in our world, for instance, religion, but also nationalism, love, etc. The operator, here, is the logic of deconstruction – how objects within our world are demonstrated to lack an independent, realist essence.
The issue with the constructivist position is that if it is logically complete, it must also apply to itself – that is, the logic of deconstruction must be applied to the totality of constructivism; constructivism also meets the condition of being constructed. Thus, for the critical study of religion position to be coherent, it must also hold that its claims concerning the social construction of reality – of the lack of essence in the category of religion – is also a constructed claim. The problem is that these critical scholars rarely make these arguments in a provisional manner. For these scholars, the claim that religion lacks essence is not going to change tomorrow; for them, religion essentially lacks an essence.[5] Thus, we see the totality paradox: the nature of totality, the realm of social construction, is governed by the logic of essencelessness. When this logic is applied to the totality itself, however, there is both transcendence and closure. There is transcendence as critical scholars seem to be operating within an ontological hierarchy, where constructivism is at the top of the pile; superior to realist ontologies, for instance. Social constructivism is the ontological framework which transcends all others, demonstrated by critical scholars through logical reasoning (Priest and Garfield, 2003, 16).[6] There is also closure as while social constructivism is at the top of an ontological hierarchy, it still operates within that hierarchy. That is, at the same time, social constructivism is presented as the right ontological position to take, but only as a constructed ontological position itself which needs to be subjected to critical analysis in the same way critical scholars study realist ontologies. A practical example of this paradox can be found in Craig Martin’s (2012) A Critical Introduction to The Study of Religion. In the introductory chapter, Martin urges students to apply hermeneutics of suspicion to every claim they encounter when studying religion, including his own. The problem, of course, is that by applying the logic of suspicion to Martin’s own claims, one must first assume that such an application is the right thing to do – better than applying a phenomenological interpretation – thus suspending a certain amount of suspicion.
The critical study of religion ontological paradox can be summarised as follows: the lack of essence is the essence of all things.
Expressibility/Semantic Paradox
The expressibility paradox is intimately connected to the ontological paradox. As such, we do not need to spend as much time describing it. The expressibility paradox arises from the contradictory nature of reality identified by the ontological paradox – that is that the world is essentially essence-less. Critical scholars reject realist truths about religion because they argue there is no realist, sui generis, reality. Only socially and historically situated truth statements/definitions can be made about religion because reality is constructed by nature, but even these statements themselves are arbitrary, only offering a mirror into the world of the definer. The critical scholars believe, therefore, that by not defining religion in a realist way, they are not making realist truth statements; this, however, is a paradox. Critical scholars make these claims because they do believe essencelessness is the nature of reality – the realist truth of existence, as it were. Thus, the problem is that on a critical religion analysis, there is no realist reality and therefore, nothing that can be said from a realist standpoint. But, by saying this, they are making realist statements about social reality and religion. In particular, they are saying that religion is a social construction and, because constructivism is the top ontology within their established hierarchy, they are at least implicitly arguing that their constructivist statements about religion are closer to a realist truth than realist claims about religion. Succinctly put, the critical religion position implies that they hold that religion lacks a realist reality and that this is religion’s realist nature and the realist truth about it. Again, there is the totality paradox: the nature of totality can and cannot be spoken about in realist terms. This applies equally to the category of religion.
It is important to note, however, that by drawing attention to these paradoxes, I am not suggesting that critical scholars are wrong in their reasoning (it is their conclusions I have issues with). Based on paraconsistent logic, the ontological and expressibility paradoxes are not irrational; instead, they are the consequence of taking the logic of constructivism to its conclusion (see below). Indeed, it is these paradoxes, and the fact that they can be argued to be logically valid, that opens numerous new routes for a critically informed Study of Religion.
A Paraconsistent Definition of Religion
The biggest lesson from this paraconsistent reading of critical religion is that by claiming to deconstruct religion from a non-realist perspective, by declining the opportunity to define religion using positive language, critical scholars have pointed out an essential core at the heart of religion which enables a positive definition of it. In other words, following the paraconsistent logic seen in critical studies of religion, a new definition can be offered which instead of working against the grain of critical thought instead moves with it. Religion, then, can be said to lack an essence because it is socially constructed and that this is its essential characteristic. Using Foucault’s definition of discourse, that discourse is ‘the practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’, we can positively define religion as a discourse. This definition is paraconsistent as it is both socially constructed and, at the same time, necessarily true.[7] Moreover, being an inclosure paradox, we have reason, following Priest, to argue that this definition is logically valid, if not dialethic – that is, true.
It is crucial to note this paraconsistent definition of religion operates at the limits of thought (see above); it is a definition which results from inclosure. However, just stating that religion is a discourse in this sense is not enough – this definition focuses on the constructivist totality; it does not focus on the subsets. The subsets of the totality, however, are equally important – and a complete definition of religion needs to take these into account. To illustrate this point, I need to briefly touch on arguments concerning the nature of subjects and their characteristics.
Philosophers, both ancient and modern, have debated the relationship between subjects and characteristics. If one takes an essentialist view, one would argue that there is a fundamental, ontological difference between subjects and characteristics, so that these things could exist independently of each other. Though, in this instance, we might ask what gives your hair, for example, the status that it has if one assumes an essential difference between subject (the hair itself) and characteristics (its colour, texture, etc.)? If your hair existed independently of colour, it would not be visible. It would seem, then, that hair is dependent on colour. At the same time, colour is dependent on a host – in this instance hair. A colour existing in a vacuum would also be invisible. Colour, in this instance, would be dependent on hair in the same sense that hair is dependent upon colour. As should be apparent, the latter position is non-essentialist and argues for the dependence of subjects and characteristics – and it is this position which is relevant for fleshing out a paraconsistent definition of religion – for understanding the relationship between the totality set and the subsets which form it.
To state that religion is a discourse is logically coherent, from a paraconsistent perspective; however, a discourse achieves its shape and character from the content social actors imbue it with. For instance, the category of religion in the 16th century was predominately Christian in style – in the sense that Christian, specifically Protestant, theological assumptions were influential in crafting its semantic content and range (Fitzgerald, 2000). Today, however, as a result of colonialism, the category of religion has somewhat diversified – though the extent of this diversification is disputed (Masuzawa, 2005). Religion is now understood to include other traditions, such as Buddhism, which give religion a different shape and feel. The point, however, is that the ontological core of religion did and did not change during these two periods. That is, religion did not change because in each period it is still a discourse. It did change in the sense that, as I have suggested, discourses are dependent on the content that defines them, and this content did change.
To finish, then, following the paraconsistent ontological hierarchy which can be found implicitly within the critical study of religion, and which is key to paraconsistent definitions of religion, it can be said that a paraconsistent definition of religion would operate at two related and unrelated levels:
- The level of the core/totality definition of religion: religion is a discourse (established at the top ontological level; at the limits of thought – that is, both in and outside the totality)
- The level of the content/subset definition of religion: the content which gives shape to the discourse of religion within any historical moment (established at a lower ontological level; in the constructivist totality – that is, within the limits of totality)
A paraconsistent Study of Religion, then, would not only be able to define religion positively, breaching a gap between anti-definers and pro-definers; it can also help establish a more theoretically rigorous research agenda. The Study of Religion, based on my paraconsistent definition, would be the study of those things which give shape and content to the discourse of religion, all the while assuming this discursive nature to be fixed. Such studies would not only involve pointing out what content is being used to characterise the discourse of religion but why such efforts are being made – to ask what roles and functions are being served by shaping the discourse of religion in particular ways. And here we come almost full circle back to the critical religion position – the position that it is best to study the uses of the category of religion and nothing more. The point now, however, is that instead of critical scholars standing on undefined ontological ground, with implied problematic inconsistency, a new paraconsistent definition of religion can firm up the theoretical ground critical scholars stand on and allow them to positively articulate their academic views on religion instead of forcing themselves into apophatic corners.
Conclusion
It could be said that my paraconsistent articulation of the critical religion position does not change much. Does, for instance, a paraconsistent definition of religion explicitly state what was already implicit in most critical work on religion? Indeed, some critical scholars have moved towards saying that religion is a discourse (see, for example, Bruce Lincoln). This all may be true, and a paraconsistent definition of religion may be nothing more than a pedantic nuance. But, by explicitly and positively articulating the critical religion position, one opens new logical routes which were previously closed off. Moreover, by using paraconsistent logic, religion can now be defined in a way acceptable to those firmly committed to critical theory. This strengthens the critical standpoint and, consequently, weakens the perspective of those who continue to define the content of the religion discourse in an essentialist sense.
Of course, another potential problem with a paraconsistent definition of religion is its dependence on the validity of paraconsistent logic – and its validity is contested.[11] Despite this, paraconsistent logic has transformed from being a fringe interest amongst philosophers of logic to become a significant philosophical intervention taken seriously by those working outside of the philosophy of logic. This does not necessarily prove anything. It does suggest, however, that paraconsistent logic should not be dismissed and that its use can lead to fruitful results. I hope I have demonstrated the useful results which could stem from applying paraconsistent logic to definitional questions in the Study of Religion.
Jack Lewis Graham
Bibliography
Fitzgerald, T. (2000). The Ideology of Religious Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Garfield, L. J. and Priest, G. (2003). Nāgārjuna and the Limits of Thought. Philosophy East and West: A Quarterly of Comparative Philosophy, Vol.53(1), 1-21.Hughes, W. A., and McConeghy, D. (2016). Religious Studies as a Discipline. Retrieved November 18, 2019, from https://www.religiousstudiesproject.com/podcast/religious-studies-as-a-discipline/ Martin, C. (2012). A Critical Introduction to the Study of Religion. Abingdon: Routledge. Masuzawa, T. (2005). The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. McCutcheon, R. T. (2003). Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Priest, G. (1998). What Is So Bad About Contradictions. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, 410-426. Priest, G. (2014). One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness. Oxford: University of Oxford Press.Ripley, D. (2015). Paraconsistent Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol.44(6), 771-780.
Empty Voices 